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Contemporary Comments 
 
THE FREEDOM OF RELIGION WITHIN A SYSTEM OF BASIC 
RIGHTS ACCORDING TO THE GERMAN BASIC LAW AND THE 
INDONESIAN CONSTITUTION* 
 
Christoph Enders1 
 
∗1 
I. Constitutional Order with Basic 
Rights under Eternal Principles  
The “Basic Rights” as laid down 
in the German constitution, the Basic 
Law of 1949, draw a conclusion from the 
universal idea of Human Rights: This 
idea is a crop of the belief, that every 
human being is endowed with dignity 
and therefore has a “right to have rights”. 
These Rights are universal, eternal, 
perhaps of divine origin, but can not be 
sued in a state court. The fundamental 
native rights of the human person 
therefore have to be written down and 
guaranteed in a constitution drafted and 
imposed by men – in the case of 
Germany: the so called Basic Law (see 
Art. 1 secs 1-3 GG). It is, as is the 1945 
Constitution of the Republic of 
Indonesia (UUD 1945), which also 
                                                            
∗ In addition to this, also with regard to the 
decision of the German Federal Constitutional 
Court of January 27th 2015 (BVerfG – 1 BvR 
471, 1181/10) and to the judgement of the 
Constitutional Court of the Republic of Indonesia 
(MKRI) of April 19th 2010 (Nr. 140/PPU-
guarantees Fundamental Rights, an 
expression of the people´s free self-
determination and constituent power (in 
other words: an expression of the 
sovereignty of the people) – as state 
unanimously the preambles of both 
constitutions as well as the relevant 
folowing provisions (of Art. 1 sec. 2 
UUD 1945 and Art. 20 sec. 2 of German 
Basic Law). 
If we compare the 1945 
Constitution of Indonesia with the 
German Basic Law there are further 
similarities: Both constitutions refer to 
the people´s will of being part of an 
international community which is 
devoted to the United Nations principle 
of promoting freedom, peace and justice 
in the world (see Preamble UUD 1945; 
Art. 1 sec. 2 GG). So it is true for the two 
states of Indonesia and of Germany that 
VII/2009). The author has to thank Wolfgang 
Brehm, Jakarta, who translated the decision of 
the MKRI Nr. 140/PUU-VII/2009 of April 19th 
2010 into German. 
1 Faculty of Law, Leipzig University, Germany 
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their national constitution is not the only 
source of law the state authority has to 
observe. Both states are integrated in the 
legal system of international law, 
including e.g. treaties on human rights 
such as the ICCPR; Germany moreover 
is part of the European Union and has to 
take into account the European Charter 
of Basic Rights, when enforcing 
European law in Germany. However, 
even then the constitution is, and 
remains, in some respect the “paramount 
law” (as the US Supreme Court stated in 
Marbury vs. Madison 1803), the 
supreme norm in the hierarchy of laws, 
which is setting the basic legal standards. 
This can be said of Indonesia as well as 
of Germany.  
Even if we can`t go into details 
here: There must be limits to the 
influence of external legal orders – at 
least because both constitutions claim to 
be built upon and to have founded the 
state on an unassailable, unalterable 
basis of implemented eternal principles. 
The 1945 Constitution of Indonesia is 
built on the five pillars of “Pancasila” as 
defined in its Preamble. Pancasila 
represents the quintessence of a 
                                                            
2 S. Butt/T. Lindsey, The Constitution of 
Indonesia, 2012, p 14 quoting Art. 2, Law 10 of 
2004 on Law-making. 
3 MKRI Nr. 140/PUU-VII/2009 Par. 3.34.9; 
3.34.23. 
legitimate legal order and the `source of 
all sources of law´2 in Indonesia. These 
pillars or principles are Humanity, the 
Unity of Indonesia, a representative and 
deliberative Democracy, Social Justice, 
however in the very first place: the belief 
in the One and Only (Almighty) God. 
One might say the constitution thereby 
acknowledges “Theism” as Indonesia’s 
state philosophy3 and as the 
“fundamental basis of national life”4, 
that may never, and in no way, be 
changed or overthrown5. German Basic 
Law in a similar way declares certain 
constitutional principles for absolutely 
unalterable: The provision of Article 79 
paragraph 3 of the Basic Law, the so 
called Eternity guarantee, stipulates that 
amendments to the Basic Law affecting 
the principles laid down in Article 1 and 
Article 20 of the Basic Law – i.e. 
democracy, the rule of law, the principles 
of the social state, of the republic, of the 
federal state, as well as the substance of 
elementary fundamental rights – shall be 
inadmissible. That means: under no 
circumstances, not even by an 
amendment of the constitution, could 
4 S. Butt/T. Lindsey, The Constitution of 
Indonesia, 2012, p 23. 
5 MKRI Nr. 140/PUU-VII/2009 Par. 3.72. 
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Germany give up these principles – as 
this would be unconstitutional6. 
However, apart from an obvious 
correlation, closer comparison between 
the two constitutional texts shows a 
significant difference: The founding 
Fathers (and Mothers) of the German 
Basic Law have been “conscious of their 
responsibility before God” (see the 
Preamble) and the German state does not 
have a distancing, hostile attitude 
towards religion and religious societies 
“in the sense of a strict separation of state 
and church”. On the opposite the state is 
called upon to safeguard religious 
freedom in many ways and to 
“(encourage) freedom of faith equally 
for all beliefs”7. However as a secular 
institution the state of the Basic Law 
stays neutral in regard to religious or 
philosophical creeds (so called religious 
and ideological neutrality required of the 
state)8. Religion is – as it is mostly in 
                                                            
6 It is in compliance with the Basic Law though 
to impose a totally new Constitution, Art. 146 
BL. 
7 See Federal Constitutional Court (FCC) 27 
January 2015 – 1 BvR 471/10, 1 BvR 1181/10, 
Volume 138, p. 296 (339, Par. 110). 
8 See FCC 27 January 2015 – 1 BvR 471/10, 1 
BvR 1181/10, Volume 138, p. 296 (339, Par. 
110). 
9 Christoph Enders, Religion as a Private Matter, 
in: Enders/Afifah Kusumadara (ed.), United in 
Diversity, 2012, p. 9. 
10 Art. 2.1 of the German Basic Law says: "Every 
person shall have the right to free development 
of his personality insofar as he does not violate 
western countries – a private matter, left 
to any individual’s “pursuit of 
happiness”9.  
It doesn´t come as a surprise, that 
in Germany the individual right to the 
free development of one´s personality 
(the general freedom of action, the right 
to do whatever one wants to do) is 
limited by all the law in compliance with 
the constitution (the “constitutional 
order”), by the rights of others and even 
by the moral law (Art. 2 Par. 1 BL) – but 
not by religious values10. Not so in 
Indonesia: As Pancasila is the supreme 
source of law (setting the standards for 
all law), which includes as its first 
principle the belief in an almighty God, 
it qualifies religious values as a genuine 
part of the constitution, creating equally 
individual rights and obligations; 
obligations, which generate limitations 
of individual freedom11. The Judgement 
of the Constitutional Court from the 19th 
the rights of others or offend against the 
constitutional order or the moral law”. Of course 
in Germany there is a close relationship between 
the rules of conduct handed down by the 
Christian (Catholic and Protestant) Church – as 
e.g. the rules given in the “Sermon of the Mount” 
in the Bible´s New Testament – and the rules of 
the “moral law” generally accepted in the society 
as a whole. Nevertheless those moral rules 
nowadays have a standing of their own and are 
no longer legitimated by their religious 
provenience.  
11 In contrary to the possible limitations stated in 
Art. 2.1 of the Basic Law Art. 28J.2 of the 1945 
Constitution of Indonesia stipulates that laws 
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of April 2010 makes it very clear: The 
Indonesian “rule of law” has to be 
interpreted from a specific, not entirely 
secular perspective12. “State 
implementation of the Pancasila” then is 
indeed all but “rhetoric”13.  
 
II. Unlimited Criticism? Opinions 
defaming religions and religious 
associations 
 This difference between the 
Indonesian and the German 
constitutional perspective may be shown 
in examining cases that concern conflicts 
between religious groups and their 
opponents or critics that behave, 
according to the self-reception of the 
religious group, indecently. A typical 
area of tension and of such conflicts 
affecting Religion and religious 
sensations is the public debate over 
“Islamization”. In Germany the fear of 
obvious or hidden “Islamization” is 
omnipresent and manifests itself in 
public protest and demonstrations (e.g. 
against the influence of Salafist circles). 
                                                            
may impose restrictions to the exercise of 
individual freedom “… in order to comply with 
just demands in accordance with considerations 
for morality, religious values (!), security and 
public order in a democratic society”. MKRI Nr. 
140/PUU-VII/2009 Par. 3.34.8. 
12 MKRI Nr. 140/PUU-VII/2009 Par. 3.34.10, 
11. 
13Different from the assertion of S. Butt/T. 
Lindsey, The Constitution of Indonesia, 2012, p 
To articulate their critical standpoint the 
protesters often used to show the 
infamous Mohammed caricatures 
(drawn by the Danish illustrator Kurt 
Westergaard).  
 
Of course, the constitution does not 
guarantee the freedom of demonstrations 
that are not peaceful, but violent (see Art. 
8 GG)14. They are against the law and 
may be prohibited. Showing caricatures 
is, however, not the kind of violent 
behaviour outlawed by the constitution 
of the Basic Law. However, is it 
offensive to show such caricatures? The 
purpose of assemblies is to express 
opinions of the people assembled. If the 
opinions are offending other persons, 
they must not be expressed even in an 
assembly and the assembly therefore 
may be prohibited. Showing Mohammed 
caricatures indeed must be considered 
offensive – although only in terms of 
religion and religious sensations. 
German courts therefore ruled15, that 
showing the Mohammed caricatures is 
14: “state implementation of the Pancasila has 
frequently been not much more than rhetoric”. 
14 Art. 8.1 BL: „All Germans have the right to 
assemble peacefully (!) and unarmed without 
prior notification or permission”. 
15 Higher Administrative Court North of Rhine-
Westphalia, April 30, 2012 (5 B 546/12); Higher 
Administrative Court of Berlin-Brandenburg, 
August 17, 2012 (1 S 117/12). See Christoph 
Enders, “Freedom of Expression and Freedom of 
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not necessarily offending other persons, 
as we have to make a distinction between 
the individuals and their religion that is 
being criticized. Showing caricatures of 
religious symbols or persons that are 
kept holy by a religious group might then 
be offending the religion and the 
religious belief of the group – but the 
religion or the religious belief or the 
religious group are not protected as such 
and the intention to protect them is not as 
such justified when it comes to limiting 
other people´s freedom. Defaming a 
religion or a religious group therefore is 
only prohibited and sanctioned by the 
criminal law, if the defaming action is 
disturbing public peace (see § 166 StGB 
– Criminal Code16). Showing the 
Mohammed caricatures in general is not 
unlawful. The Indonesian Constitutional 
Court was right, when it stressed the 
difference between a western and the 
                                                            
Assembly in the German Constitution”, in: 
Afifah Kusumadara/Christoph Enders (ed.), 
United in Diversity – Citizenship and Education, 
2013, p. 1 (6).  
16 Section 166 of the German Penal Code 
(“Defamation of religions, religious and 
ideological associations”) says: “(1) Whosoever 
publicly or through dissemination of written 
materials (section 11.3) defames the religion or 
ideology of others in a manner that is capable of 
disturbing the public peace, shall be liable to 
imprisonment of not more than three years or a 
fine. (2) Whosoever publicly or through 
dissemination of written materials (section 11.3) 
defames a church or other religious or ideological 
association within Germany, or their institutions 
or customs in a manner that is capable of 
Indonesian constitutional perspective 
and stated that in western countries 
defaming a religion or a religious group 
might be – under certain circumstances – 
allowed17.  
 
III. Strong Constitutional Protection 
of the Religious Freedom – and its 
Limitations 
1. Constitution´s Unconditional 
Guarantee of Freedom of Faith and 
Religion 
 On the other hand: The 
freedom of faith and the freedom to 
profess a religious (or ideological) belief 
are very strongly protected by the 
German Basic Law (Art. 4 secs. 1 and 2 
GG)18. When examining the wording of 
these provisions we note that there is no 
explicit allowance for the legislative to 
interfere with these freedoms by 
enactment of a legal statute19. That 
disturbing the public peace, shall incur the same 
penalty.” 
17 MKRI Nr. 140/PUU-VII/2009, Par. 3.34.10, 
11. However also see the text at footnote 23. 
Interpreting religious rules as adhered to by a 
religious association or group in a specific way 
that differs from the majority´s standpoint and 
even outspoken criticism does not mean 
defaming a religion or a religious belief. 
18 Art. 4.1,2 BL: “(1) Freedom of faith and of 
conscience, and freedom to profess a religious or 
philosophical creed, shall be inviolable. (2) The 
undisturbed practice of religion shall be 
guaranteed.”  
19 Different from the regulation by the 1945 
Constitution of Indonesia, which states 
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means that these freedoms are 
guaranteed unconditionally. Restrictions 
not only require a sufficiently definite 
statutory basis but must be contained in 
the constitution itself. “This includes the 
fundamental rights of third parties and 
community values of constitutional 
status …”20 The limitation in question 
here is a constitution-immanent 
limitation, a limitation to fundamental 
rights inherent to the constitution.  
 In addition these values of 
constitutional status are to be protected 
in a manner that is only interfering with 
the freedom of faith and religion as far as 
necessary. Interference has to be 
proportional, because burden of proof 
that exercising a guaranteed freedom 
causes damage for the community (the 
rights of its members or the values 
acknowledged by constitution) lies with 
the state authority. The constitutional 
principle of proportionality therefore 
stipulates, that each law that interferes 
with a constitutionally guaranteed 
individual freedom, must be 
proportional: it must be suitable and 
necessary to reach its legitimate aim and 
last but not least it must be appropriate. 
Disproportionate interferences with 
                                                            
limitations to the freedom of religion (Art. 29 
sec. 2) in Art. 28J, see footnote 10. 
guaranteed freedoms of the individual 
are unconstitutional, because they 
unreasonably restrict the freedom of the 
individual. 
 
2. The German “Headscarf Cases” of 
2015 
 These elements of the 
Constitution´s “unconditional 
protection” of the freedom of faith and 
religion describe the legal framework the 
Federal Constitutional Court had to take 
into account when deciding the 
“Headscarf Cases” in 2015: Two female 
Muslim teachers (of German nationality) 
would not be allowed to wear a headscarf 
(or: a woollen hat worn as replacement) 
at public school. Both argued that they 
would wear the headscarf for religious 
reasons, because they considered the rule 
to cover themselves in the public to be 
binding due to their Islamic religious 
belief. The school objected and imposed 
sanctions on the women, applying a law 
that prohibited wearing clothes with a 
religious connotation at public school in 
order to prevent any interference with the 
pupils` negative freedom of faith and to 
profess a belief.  
20 See FCC 24 September 2003 – 2 BvR 1436/02, 
Volume 108, 282 (297, par. 38). 
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 The Constitutional Court 
however ruled that “wearing clothes with 
a religious connotation does not per se 
constitute an interference with the 
pupil´s negative freedom of faith and 
freedom to profess a belief (Art. 4 secs 1 
and 2 GG). As long as members of the 
teaching staff do not verbally promote 
their position or their faith and do not try 
to influence the pupils apart from their 
outer appearance, pupils are only 
confronted with the positive freedom of 
faith as exercised by educational staff 
…”21 
 Before we come to analyse the 
main argument of this ruling, the 
question arises, who decides that the 
behaviour of a person qualifies as 
exercise of his or her religious belief and 
therefore is protected by the 
Constitution. Not every Muslim woman 
is wearing a headscarf. So we might 
doubt, that the headscarf is worn due to 
an absolute binding rule, a rule that is 
perceived as imperative. Here the ruling 
of the German Constitutional Court 
differs from the argument given in the 
Decision of the Indonesian 
Constitutional Court of April 19th 2010 
concerning the Blasphemy Law. The 
                                                            
21 See FCC 27 January 2015 – 1 BvR 471/10, 1 
BvR 1181/10, Volume 138, p. 296 (337, Par. 
105).   
Indonesian Court pointed out that the 
authentic interpretation of religious rules 
and duties – as far as outer appearance or 
conduct is concerned (“forum 
externum”) – is the responsibility of the 
officially recognised religious 
community and their official 
representatives (Ulama)22. This 
perspective causes difficulties for 
differing doctrines of minority cults and 
individuals. In contrast to this view the 
German Federal Constitutional Court 
notes that “one has to take into account 
the self-perception both (!) of the 
relevant religious community and of the 
individual concerned. However, the state 
authorities (not the individual!) may 
analyse and decide whether it has been 
made plausible, with sufficient 
substantiation, that the conduct can 
actually be attributed to the scope of 
application of Art. 4 GG”. On the basis 
of these arguments German courts e.g. 
qualified the “Church of the flying 
Spaghetti Monster” as a joke, that did not 
deserve being acknowledged as a 
religious association, and whose “rules” 
could not benefit from the protection that 
Freedom of Religion is awarded by the 
constitution.  
22 MKRI Nr. 140/PUU-VII/2009, Par. 3.53. 
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 In the Headscarf Case, that the 
German Constitutional Court had to 
decide, it did not matter, as the court 
stated, “that the exact content of the 
female dress code is quite disputed 
among Islamic scholars and that some 
schools of Islam do not have such a 
compulsory rule. It is sufficient that this 
interpretation exists in different schools 
of Islam and can be traced back to two 
verses in the Quran, in particular”. The 
two Muslim women in this sense had 
“plausibly demonstrated that, in their 
case – and in accordance with the self-
perception of some Islamic groups –, 
covering themselves in public 
constitutes an imperative religious 
duty”23.  
What is the main reason that the 
strict prohibition of expressing one´s 
religious belief by wearing the headscarf 
unreasonably restricts the freedom of 
faith, so that the limitation is 
disproportionate and unconstitutional? 
Shouldn´t the female Muslim teacher 
show consideration for the possible 
uneasiness of pupils and their parents 
and shouldn´t she therefore refrain from 
following the rule to cover her head and 
                                                            
23 See FCC 27 January 2015 – 1 BvR 471/10, 1 
BvR 1181/10, Volume 138, p. 296 (332, Par. 96). 
24 See FCC 27 January 2015 – 1 BvR 471/10, 1 
BvR 1181/10, Volume 138, p. 296 (336, Par. 
take off her headscarf at public school? 
It is crucial here that pursuant to the 
(neutral and) pluralistic approach of the 
Basic Law´s constitutional order, there is 
no individual right to not be confronted 
with “cultic acts, religious symbols and 
professions of other faiths”. In the words 
of the Constitutional Court: “in a society 
that affords space to differing religious 
convictions, he or she has no right to be 
spared cultic acts, religious symbols and 
professions of other faiths”.24 
Consequently there is no specific duty of 
consideration for the religious sensations 
of other people, may they belong to the 
minority or the majority group. And this 
exactly makes a strict prohibition of the 
expression of religious beliefs, to 
prevent “a mere abstract danger to the 
peace at school or to the neutrality of the 
state” disproportionate and 
unconstitutional – because the religious -
pluralist society is just mirrored in public 
school25. 
 
3. A Loophole: “Peace at School” and 
Public Peace 
 In the end, the German 
Constitutional Court has to calm down 
104; 343, Par. 116); FCC 24 September 2003 – 2 
BvR 1436/02, Volume 108, p. 282 (301 f.). 
25 See FCC 27 January 2015 – 1 BvR 471/10, 1 
BvR 1181/10, Volume 138, p. 296 (337, Par. 
105). 
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critics, who are afraid that the state now 
has been deprived of any means that 
would allow him to guarantee peace at 
school and to exercise its educational 
mandate (Art. 7 sec. 1 GG) in any case, 
also in case of necessity. And we can see 
how the argumentations of the two 
courts, the German Federal 
Constitutional Court and the Indonesian 
Constitutional at last/eventually come 
closer to one another: A mere abstract 
danger, says the Federal Constitutional 
Court, to the peace at school does not 
necessitate, and therefore will not justify, 
a strict prohibition of the expression of 
religious beliefs. If there is a sufficiently 
specific danger to the peace at school or 
to the neutrality of the state however 
(more or less: for the public order), a 
prohibition of exercising freedom of 
faith may be justified – no matter who is 
responsible for this danger26. So if pupils 
or parents would feel disturbed and 
offended by a Muslim teacher wearing a 
headscarf and would give loud and 
radical expression to this uneasiness, this 
could and probably would cause a 
                                                            
26 We notice a similar reasoning in France, where 
– after the terror strike of July 14th 2016 – the use 
of Burkini bathing suites had been banned at 
some beaches by local mayors to protect public 
order. The ban imposed by a community at the 
Cote d´Azur has been annulled by the Conseil 
d´Etat (State Council) on August 26th 2016, 
because a mere abstract danger does not justify 
specific danger for peace at school. It 
then – obviously a loophole to keep up in 
any case peace at school as well as in the 
public – “would be reasonable to expect 
the educational staff to refrain from 
following the rule to cover their heads” – 
even if they (the Muslim teachers) 
perceive that rule as imperative27.  
 This argument reminds us of 
the reasons given by the Indonesian 
Constitutional Court to uphold the 
Blasphemy Law in 201028: The state is 
responsible to protect public safety and 
public order and sometimes has to force 
the minorities to keep quiet, even if it is 
not them who imminently cause the 
social trouble or political unrest. Even 
the revolutionary French “Declaration of 
the Rights of Man and of the Citizen” 
(from 1789) was in this way concerned 
about the public order and therefore 
stated in its Article 10: “No one shall be 
disquieted on account of his opinions, 
including his religious views, provided 
their manifestation does not disturb the 
public order established by law”.  This 
seems to be a universal rule of 
such an interference with individual freedom. 
Only the protection against a specific danger to 
the public order may justify the prohibition of an 
outer conduct. 
27 See FCC 27 January 2015 – 1 BvR 471/10, 1 
BvR 1181/10, Volume 138, p. 296 (341, Par. 
113).   
28 MKRI Nr. 140/PUU-VII/2009, Par. 3.52, 3.61.  
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maintaining political authority, valid in 
Germany as in Indonesia as all over the 
world. 
 
 
